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INTRODUCTION

It was a warm summer evening just like any other in Charleston, South
Carolina. Many people surely hurried home from work to fix dinner, as
children went inside to cool off after a hot day of fun in the Carolina
sunshine. Others made their way to midweek Bible study, seeking a couple
of hours of spiritual reflection among a community of friends and neighbors.
One of those parishioners was Reverend Clementa Pinckney. Earlier that
day, Reverend Pinckney made the trip from Ridgeland to the State House in
Columbia to attend a committee meeting as a state senator representing his
Lowcountry constituency.' After a long day of traveling, meetings, and

1.
Todd C. Frankel, Clementa Pinckney, Preacher and Legislator, Spoke Out for
Justice, WASH. POST (June 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
pastor-and-state-senator-remembered-for-preaching-calls-for-justice/2015/06/18/793c0 162-15
cc-Il e5-89f3-6141 Oda94eb lstory.html?utmterm=.d8e074f994af.
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events, he made his way home to his congregation at Emanuel AME Church
to lead them in prayer.2 A young, new face sought to join Reverend
Pinckney and others, and they welcomed him with open arms. 3 Little did
they know he intended to take their lives in hopes of starting a "race war." 4
Nine precious souls were lost that night because the color of their skin was
black, and the fellow pulling the trigger had a heart full of hatred for those
kinds of people.5
Dylann Roof was convicted and sentenced to death for these crimes
under federal hate crime laws. 6 The federal government and a majority of
states have enacted laws that identify bias-motivated crimes as hate crimes,
and these laws have largely been held constitutional. A "hate crime" can be
defined as "a criminal offense against a person or property motivated in
whole or in part by an offender's bias against a race, religion, disability,
sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity." 7 Hate crimes are
not perpetrated solely against African-Americans,8 nor are they
geographically confined to a particular region of the United States. 9 Hate
crimes affect people of every race, color, gender, religion, ethnicity, and

2.
See id.
3.
See Mark Berman, Dylann Roof Will Plead Guilty to Murderfor Charleston Church
Massacre, Avoiding Second Death-Penalty Trial, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/3 1/dylann-roof-will-plead-guilty-to-murder
-for-charleston-church-massacre-avoiding-second-death-penalty-trial/.
4.
Kevin Sack & Alan Blinder, No Regretsfrom Dylann Roof in JailhouseManifesto,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/us/no-regrets-from-dylannroof-in-jailhouse-manifesto.html.
5.
See David Lohr, Charleston Church Shooting Victims Identified, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 18, 2015, 12:44 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/18/charleston-chur
ch-shooting-victims-identified n7611838.html.
6. Dustin Waters & Kevin Sullivan, Dylann Roof Guilty on 33 Counts ofFederalHate
Crimesfor Charleston Church Shooting, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/national/dylann-roof-guilty-on-33-counts-of-federal-hate-crimes-for-charleston-c
hurch-shooting/2016/12/15/Obfad9e4-c2ea-le6-9578-0054287507dbstory.html?utmterm=.
bac07ebc4e8f.
7.
Hate Crimes, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
civil-rights/hate-crimes (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
8.
See 2016 Hate Crime Statistics Table I Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known
Offenders by Bias Motivation, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hatecrime/2016/tables/table-I (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
9.
See 2016 Hate Crime Statistics Table 1]-Offenses by ParticipatingState, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/tables/table-11 (last visited
Jan. 20, 2018).
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sexual orientation.1 0 Their impact extends beyond the person victimized to
their families, communities, and society as a whole."
Roof was prosecuted under federal hate crime laws because South
Carolina is one of only five states without some type of hate crime statute.12
In these five states, crimes are prosecuted as hate crimes only when the
federal government brings charges under federal law.' 3 Accordingly, hate
crime victims in these states must rely on federal intervention to address the
particular heinousness inherent only in hate-motivated crimes.1 4 Federal
prosecution of hate crimes, however, is limited because the federal
government can act only through its powers enumerated in the
Constitution.' 5 Moreover, states are better equipped to address and prosecute
these crimes locally because their law enforcement officers are on the front
lines in their communities,1 6 and states collectively have more resources
than the federal government.' 7
This Note advocates that South Carolina should adopt a hate crime
statute that enhances the penalty of the crime when the perpetrator
intentionally selects the victim because of his or her race, color, religion,
national origin, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender
identity. This state must adopt this type of law not only to further protect its
citizens from bias-motivated crime, but also to make clear that South
Carolina does not tolerate hate-producing violence of any kind. Part II of this
Note analyzes the historical evolution of hate crime legislation in the United
States and the emergence of federal hate crime regulation through modern
statutes. Because state hate crime legislation is derived from early federal
statutes, a historical discussion of federal laws is necessary. Similarly, Part
III explores state hate crime laws through a discussion of the need for state

10. See Hate Crime Statistics, 2016 Victims, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/topic-pages/victims.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
11. See Hate Crimes, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/hate-crimes-0

(last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
12. See ADL Hate Crime Map, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/adlhate-crime-map (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
13. See Ed Buckley, South CarolinaNeeds a Hate Crime Law, POST & COURIER (July
24, 2015), https://www.postandcourier.com/opinion/south-carolina-needs-a-hate-crime-law/art

icle_58f9af3c-b395-581c-9f4f-a58f42865eal.html.
14. See id.
15. See Matthew Trout, Note, Federalizing Hate: Constitutional and Practical
Limitations to the Matthew Shepard andJames Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009,

52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 131, 132 (2015).
16. See The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 909
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 171 (2009) [hereinafter Holder Testimony]
(statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen. of the United States).
17. Trout, supra note 15, at 150.
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legislation in addition to federal legislation and also addresses constitutional
concerns regarding hate crime statutes. Hate crime legislation, in general,
has been challenged as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.'"
However, several cases challenging state statutes have been constitutionally
upheld.' 9 Part IV of this Note explains why South Carolina must adopt a
hate crime statute and analyzes the current political climate surrounding this
issue by discussing legislative concerns from previous hate crime bills.
Finally, Part V discusses two statutory models-the discriminatory selection
and racial animus models-that often help shape hate crime legislation. This
Part also provides guidance and suggestions for the adoption of a hate crime
statute by the South Carolina General Assembly.
II.

BACKGROUND

State hate crime law, as we understand it today, is derived from early
federal legislation that criminalized the acts of preventing or denying
another from exercising his or her rights. The purpose of early federal laws
was to broadly protect citizens from interference with their rights, while
modem state hate crime laws more narrowly address criminal acts against a
particular group because of a characteristic they possess. 20 To understand
modem state hate crime law, a historical discussion of federal hate crime
legislation is necessary. Section A of this Part will begin with a discussion of
early federal hate crime legislation, specifically the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871. Next, two additional federal statutes will be introduced, which
Congress enacted to further protect American citizens from deprivation of
their guaranteed federal rights based on certain characteristics. Section B
will introduce a precursor to modem hate crime laws, the Civil Rights Act of
1968. Finally, Section C will discuss modem federal statutes relating
specifically to hate crime and will conclude by discussing the most recent
federal statute, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2009.
A.

Early FederalHate Crime Legislation

The first federal hate crime statute was the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.21
Following the end of the Civil War, many local law enforcement agencies

18.
19.
20.
21.

See discussion infra Section III.B.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012) provides:
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within former Confederate states failed to prosecute crimes committed by
whites against blacks and to protect African-Americans' recently established

1.

Preventing officer from performing duties

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or
place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof;
or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State,
district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to
injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties
of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his
property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his
official duties;
2.

Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from
attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account
of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or
indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his
person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully
assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more
persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating,
in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny
to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for
lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of
persons, to the equal protection of the laws;
3.

Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat,
any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a
legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as
an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United
States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or
advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012).
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Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law. 22 In
response, the Ku Klux Klan Act "authorize[d] federal prosecution of the Ku
Klux Klan and others, including law enforcement and government officials,
who denied the newly freed slaves their civil rights." 23 The Act made it
illegal for persons to conspire to deprive "any person, or class of persons, of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws." 24 Specifically, the Act provided a cause of action for recovery of
damages if a person conspired to or caused another to be "injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having or exercising any right or
privilege."

25

Unlike modem hate crime statutes, the purpose of federal statutes was
not to provide enhanced penalties for established crimes. 26 Rather, statutes
like the Ku Klux Klan Act provided the only option of protecting victimized
former slaves against those who attempted to deny them their rights and
privileges. 27 In fact, these federal laws would not have been necessary had
local law enforcement properly addressed the issue and prosecuted the
offenders themselves. 28 In South Carolina, several Ku Klux Klan members
were arrested and tried under the Act in an attempt by the federal
government to show the measures it was willing to take in order to preserve
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.29
Congress enacted two additional post-Civil War statutes that not only
punished conspiracy to violate another's rights but also sought to protect
private citizens from deprivation of their federally guaranteed rights by
federal, state, or local government based on certain characteristics.3 0
The first statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241 provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any person . .. in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States ...

or;

22. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND
IDENTITY POLITICS 36 (1998).
&

23. Id.
24. Jennifer L. Woodson, Hate Crime Regulation and Challenges, 9 GEO. J. GENDER
L. 543, 544 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2012)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012).
26.

See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 22.

27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See also Kermit L. Hall, PoliticalPower and ConstitutionalLegitimacy: The South
CarolinaKu Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872,33 EMORY L.J. 921, 928 (1984).
30. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 22, at 37.
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If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured ... They shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years
or both . . . .31
The second post-Civil War statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 242 provides:

Whoever, under color of any law,... willfully subjects any
person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account
of such person being alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than
are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined ... or
imprisoned . . . .32
Similar to the Ku Klux Klan Act, neither of the two post-Civil War
statutes was enacted to provide harsher punishment of criminals because of
their prejudices against their victims. 33 Instead, their purpose was to broadly
protect all victims and ensure equal enforcement against all offenders. 34
These post-Civil War statutes apply more broadly than modem state
hate crime statutes in that they apply to everyone rather than only those
victims who belong to groups listed in the hate crime statute. 35 In other
words, although these laws concern conduct that seems very similar to hate
crime, they do not fully address the problem as modem statutes attempt to
do because they were not intended for that purpose. 36 Instead, the purpose of
these statutes was to punish a category of crimes known as "rights
interference crimes" 37 and to broadly protect an individual's civil rights as
opposed to punishing bias crimes as a separate category. 38

31. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (emphasis added).
33. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 22, at 37.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Luin Wang, The Transforming Power of Hate: Social Cognition Theory and the
Harms ofBias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 63-64 (1997).
37. Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens REA of
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2116 n.5, 2117, 2208 (1992-1993)
(explaining that when there was no pure federal bias crime statute, §§ 242 and 245(b)(2) of
Title 18 of the U.S. Code provided federal proscriptions against "rights interference crimes"
that were racially motivated); see 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (proscribing punishment of persons
who interfere with another's rights because of his or her color or race); 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)
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The Civil Rights Act of 1968

As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which addresses racial violence
against civil rights workers and individuals pursuing federally protected
activities,39 Congress enacted a statute entitled "Federally Protected
Activities," which is considered today to be a "precursor to the modem state
hate crime laws." 40 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) provides:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or
threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or
attempts to interfere with ... any person because of his race, color,
religion, or national origin and because he is or has
been ... enrolling in or attending a public school or university;
participating in any benefit, program, service or facility provided by
a state or local government; applying or working for any state or
local government or private employer; serving as a juror; traveling
in or using any facility of interstate commerce, or using an vehicle,
terminal or facility of any common carrier; or using any public
facility, such as a bar, restaurant, store, hotel, movie theater, or
stadium shall be punished .... 4
This statute was designed to provide a remedy for victims of violence
resulting from interference with their right to march, vote, serve as a
member of a jury, and enroll in public schools among other protected
activities. 42 Specifically, subsection (b)(2) protects several categories of
state and local activities from interference motivated by prejudices against
another's race, color, religion, or national origin. 43 Under this statute, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant attacked a victim, who was
participating in a state or local activity, with the purpose to interfere because
of prejudice against the victim's race, color, religion, or national origin. 44 It

(2012) (punishing interference with activities related to voting, enrolling in public school, and
so forth).
38. See Lawrence, supra note 37, at 2116 n.5; see also JACOBS & POTTER, supra note
22, at 36.
39. Woodson, supra note 24, at 545.
40. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 22, at 38.
41. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2012)).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.; Lawrence, supra note 37, at 2213.
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is not required, however, that the offender's prejudice be the only motivation
behind the interference.4 5
C. Modern FederalStatutes
Hate crime legislation can typically be categorized into four groups:
specific acts, sentence enhancement, statistics collection, and civil
remedies.46 A specific acts statute makes the offender's selection of the
victim because of bias a separate offense that the prosecution may charge the
defendant with in addition to the underlying criminal offense. 47 An example
of a specific acts statute is section 245 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.48
A sentence enhancement statute is an alternative hate crime statute that,
rather than creating a separate offense, enhances the defendant's sentence for
a crime if the offender's bias or hate motivation can be shown. 49 In 1994, as
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Congress
passed the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, which requires the
United States Sentencing Commission to "promulgate guidelines or amend
existing guidelines to provide sentencing enhancement of not less than three
offense levels for offenses that the finder of fact at trial determines beyond a
5
reasonable doubt are hate crimes."o
The Sentencing Commission amended
its guidelines as a result of this statute to include enhanced punishment for
crimes motivated by bias. 5 1
A statistics collection statute mandates that the government, through its
agencies, collect data regarding bias-motivated crime activity. 52 In 1990,
Congress enacted the Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA), 53 which mandated
that the federal government develop procedures for "implementing,
collecting and managing hate crime data." 54 The HCSA was the first federal
statute to use the term "hate crime" and to bring national attention to the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 22, at 38.

Woodson, supra note 24, at 545.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
51. See Woodson, supra note 24, at 546-47.
52. Id. at 548.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012).
54. Hate Crime Statistics 2010, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
hate-crime/2010/resources/hate-crime-2010-about-hate-crime (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
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issue." Specifically, the Act directs the Attorney General to collect data
"about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, gender and
gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity." 5 6 The
Attorney General has since delegated this task to the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who assigned the operation to the Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. 7
A civil remedy statute allows hate crime victims to vindicate their
individual rights and recover damages." As an example, in 1994, Congress
passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which provides a civil
action for recovery against "a person who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right [to be free from
crimes of violence] .59

Finally, the most recent federal hate crime statute incorporates elements
common to both specific acts as well as sentence enhancement statutes. In
2009, Congress passed the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA), which extended federal hate crime law to
include "violence motivated by the . . . gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability of the victim." 60 Most notably, the statute "expand[ed]

55. VALERIE JENNESS & RYKEN GRATTET, MAKING HATE A CRIME: FROM SOCIAL
MOVEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 44, 53 (2001).

28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012).
See Hate Crime Statistics 2010, supra note 54.
See Woodson, supra note 24, at 547.
42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14040 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). This statute provides in part:
(1) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes bodily
injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an
explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person,
because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any
person(A) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with
this title, or both; and
(B) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in
accordance with this title, or both, if(i) death results from the offense; or
(ii) the offense includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap,
aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill.
(2) Offenses involving actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.(A) In general.-Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, in
any circumstance described in subparagraph (B) or paragraph (3), willfully
causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a
dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause
bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived religion,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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federal jurisdiction over hate crimes by eliminating the requirement that
victims engage in 'federally protected activities' and increase[d] federal
funding for the investigation and prosecution of these crimes."61
Specifically, the statute punishes anyone who "willfully causes bodily injury
to any person or ... attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because
of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any
person,"62 or "the actual or perceived ... gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability of any person." 63 Despite the Act's expansion of hate
crime law beyond federally protected activities, state hate crime law remains
necessary because of the constitutional and practical problems that limit the
Act's effectiveness.

64

III. STATE HATE CRIME LAW

Because the federal government will not investigate and prosecute all
hate crimes, state hate crime laws must also be enacted and enforced.
Despite challenges to both federal and state hate crime laws on the grounds
that they unconstitutionally violate a defendant's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, several court cases challenging state statutes have
proved that hate crime legislation is constitutional if drafted carefully.
Section A of this Part will explain the necessity for state hate crime laws
separate from the federal hate crime laws discussed in Part II. Section B will
address constitutional concerns relating to hate crime laws, focusing on state
statutes that have been challenged in court.

national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability of any
person(i) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance
with this title, or both; and
(ii) shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life, fined in
accordance with this title, or both, if(I) death results from the offense; or
(II) the offense includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap,
aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill.
61. Carter T. Coker, Note, Hope-Fulfillingor Effectively Chilling?Reconciling the Hate
Crimes PreventionAct with the FirstAmendment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 271, 273 (2011).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 249(a)(2).
64. See Trout, supra note 15, at 132.
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The Need for State Hate Crime Legislation

Even though federal hate crime laws establish authority for prosecution
of violent crimes motivated by bias towards a particular characteristic of the
victim, state hate crime laws are vital nonetheless to ensuring that these
crimes are fully prosecuted because the federal government will not address
all hate crimes. Specifically, the Department of Justice maintains a
"backstop policy" for all criminal, civil rights investigations in which the
Department defers prosecution to state and local law enforcement officials.65
Only in cases where the federal interest outweighs the usual justifications of
the backstop policy will the federal government prosecute the crimes.66
In fact, the Shepard-Byrd hate crime prevention bill was designed only
to assist state and local law enforcement in their investigations and
prosecutions by providing funding and other resources to effectively address
local hate crime. 67 The bill was not intended to replace state and local law
enforcement with the federal government as the primary investigative,
prosecutorial, and enforcement authority for hate crime. 68 Furthermore,
unlike states, which are authorized to enact criminal laws under their police
power, the federal government is limited to the powers granted to it under
the Constitution, such as its Commerce Clause and Thirteenth Amendment
powers. 69 Rather than rely solely on the Shepard-Byrd Act, "state and
federal hate crime law should be complementary, each supporting the other
to produce an effective regime of criminal justice." 70
B.

ConstitutionalChallenges

Opponents to hate crime legislation have challenged both federal and
state statutes on the grounds that they violate the offender's First
Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. However, various cases challenging
the constitutionality of state hate crime statutes have proved otherwise.
Although the United States Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance as
unconstitutional in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul7' because it sought to prohibit
protected speech, state hate crime statutes which seek to penalize criminal

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Holder Testimony, supra note 16.
Id
Id at 170.
See id.
Trout, supra note 15, at 139-41.
Id at 153.
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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conduct carried out against another on the basis of race or other protected
category have been upheld.72 Specifically, the Court found the ordinance
unconstitutional because it only criminalized "biased fighting words
differently than other fighting words," 73 which violated the First
Amendment. The ordinance provided that
[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to,
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 74
The Court determined that the ordinance was unconstitutional, finding
that "St. Paul impermissibly engaged in content-based discrimination by
selectively

proscribing

certain

threats . . . while

leaving

other

threats

untouched." 7 ' The Court suggested, however, in dicta that "[a]n ordinance
not limited to the favored topics .

.

. would have precisely the same

beneficial effect" without "displaying the city council's special hostility
76
toward the particular biases thus singled out."

The following year, the United States Supreme Court held in Wisconsin
v. Mitchell77 that a statute providing for enhancement of a defendant's
sentence whenever he intentionally selects his victim based on the victim's
race did not violate the defendant's free speech rights by purporting to
punish his biased beliefs, and the statute was not overbroad.7 1 The statute
provided an increased sentence for a person who "[i]ntentionally selects the
person against whom the crime .

.

. is committed or selects the property

which is damaged or otherwise affected . .. because of race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the
owner or occupant of that property." 79 Unlike in R.A. V., the Court

72. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993).
73. Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws after Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 21 OHIo N.U. L.
REV. 863, 864 (1995).
74. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380, 393.
75. Id. at 392-94; Trout, supra note 15, at 144.
76. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395.
77. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
78. See id. at 484-85, 488-89.
79. Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (2017) provides:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crimes
are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
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determined that the Wisconsin statute was "aimed at conduct unprotected by
the First Amendment" and not at expression.so Since the Court's decision in
Mitchell, state hate crime sentence enhancement statutes similar to
Wisconsin's have been constitutionally upheld.
Although states remain free to decide that sentence enhancement
statutes violate their own state constitution, several state supreme courts
have held that they do not." For example, the Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the claim that their constitution prohibits penalty enhancement,82
and "the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the constitutionality of the
Washington statute." 83
Bias-motivated crime statutes have also been challenged as violating the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution by being unconstitutionally
vague. 8 4 Specifically, "[t]he due process clause requires that a criminal
statute give clear notice of what activity is proscribed and provide adequate

(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a)
is committed or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by
the crime under par. (a) in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or
perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner or occupant of the
property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception was correct.
(2)(a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor
other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and
the revised maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county jail.
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A
misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the status of the
crime to a felony and the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised
maximum period of imprisonment is 2 years.
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a felony, the
maximum fine prescribed by law may be increased by not more than $5,000
and the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may
be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable for
the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special
verdict as to all the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction
for that crime.
80. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487.
81. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, HATE CRIME LAWS - THE ADL APPROACH 10,
https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Hate-Crimes-Law
-The-ADL-Approach.pdf.
82. See State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 562-64 (Or. 1992); State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d
11, 13 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
83. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81; see State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Or.
1993).
84.

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81, at 10.
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guidelines to prevent arbitrary law enforcement actions."" Defendants in
state cases challenging statutes on this ground focused on the "by reason of'
or "because of' language, arguing that, "these clauses do not make clear
when bigoted behavior will be punished." 8 6 However, "because the statutes
require the commission of an underlying crime,

. .

. the state courts largely

have rejected these claims."8
One exception is Botts v. State" in which the Supreme Court of Georgia
concluded that the "because of bias or prejudice"89 language of its state hate
crime penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague "because of the broad
signification of these words and the absence of any specific context in which
a person's bias or prejudice may apply." 90 Specifically, the court found that
the use of "because of bias or prejudice" in the statute failed to give clear
notice of the prohibited conduct. 91 Therefore, hate crime statutes should be
crafted carefully, and those statutes that closely resemble the language of
Wisconsin's statute will likely be successfully enacted and enforced.92
In addition, the intentional selection component of sentence
enhancement hate crime laws must be established beyond a reasonable doubt
at trial so as not to violate the Due Process Clause. In Apprendi v. New
Jersey,9 3 after the defendant was convicted of the underlying criminal
offense, the trial judge, in his discretion, found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant committed the crime "with a purpose to
intimidate" a person or group because of race. 94 The United States Supreme
Court held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 95
Therefore, intentional selection of the victim motivated by bias must be

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. 2004).
89. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17 (repealed 2004). The law read in part: "[I]f the trier of
fact determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim
or any property of the victim as the object of the offense because of bias or prejudice, the
judge imposing sentence shall ..... The Georgia House of Representatives proposed a bill in
January 2018 to include more specific language: "[B]ecause of such individual's actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
disability." H.R. 492, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018).
90. Botts, 604 S.E.2d at 514.
91. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17(a)).
92.

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81, at 10.

93.
94.
95.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 520 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 490.
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proven during trial and determined by a jury for the penalty enhancement to
apply without violating due process.
Lastly, bias-motivated crime statutes have been constitutionally
challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 96 Specifically, the parties to these cases "have suggested either
that the statutes unconstitutionally benefit minorities, because minorities are
more likely to be victims of bias crimes, or that the statutes
unconstitutionally burden majority members because majority members are
more likely to be prosecuted." 97 In each case challenging the statute on equal
protection grounds, "the state court rejected the argument, noting that the
statute is neutral on its face and that the state has a legitimate interest in
punishing hate crimes more severely." 98 Therefore, although hate crime
legislation has often been challenged as violating the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the cases discussed in this Section prove that hate crime
statutes may withstand constitutional scrutiny if drafted carefully.
IV.

THE NEED FOR A HATE CRIME STATUTE IN SOUTH CAROLINA

A.

Justification

South Carolina needs a hate crime law to deter bias-motivated violence
with the threat of enhanced punishment because of the intentional selection
of the victim based on race, gender, religion, or other perceived
characteristic. In order to fully comprehend the need for a hate crime statute
in South Carolina, it is necessary to understand the justifications for hate
crime legislation generally. American lawyer and civil rights scholar
Frederick Lawrence explains the necessity of enhanced punishment for hate
crimes in his book PunishingHate:
The enshrinement of racial harmony and equality among our
highest values not only calls for independent punishment of racially
motivated violence as a bias crime and not merely as a parallel
crime; it also calls for enhanced punishment of bias crimes over

96. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81, at 10.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 10-11. Penalty enhancement hate crime statutes do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as long as they are applied equally to all
people. Note, Hate Is Not Speech: A ConstitutionalDefense of Penalty Enhancementfor Hate
Crimes, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1330 (1993); see State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11, 13 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) ("Anyone may be a victim of bigotry."); see also, e.g., State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d
450, 456, 457 (Ohio 1992); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 566 (Or. 1992).
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parallel crimes. If bias crimes are not punished more harshly than
parallel crimes, the implicit message expressed by the criminal
justice system is that racial harmony and equality are not among the
highest values in our society. If a racially motivated assault is
punished identically to a parallel assault . .. [n]ot only has the crime
itself occurred, but the underlying hatred of the crime is invisible to
the eye of the legal system. The punishment of bias crimes . . . is

necessary for the full expression of commitment to American values
of equality of treatment and opportunity. 99
In addition to the need for enhanced punishment for bias crimes to
condemn the evil character of offenders, hate crime legislation also
addresses the tensions between individualized and group justice. 00
Specifically, "the psychological and moral need for individual justice is
undermined when victims are harmed because they are treated as members
of a category rather than as unique beings."'0 ' Unlike parallel crimes, bias
crimes contribute to the cultural marginalization of groups and increase the
risk of future assault. 102 Bias-motivated violence "rel[ies] on a despised
theory of human worth that has been rejected by our modem constitutional
culture,"1 03 and for this reason, offenders of bias-motivated crimes are more
culpable and more harmful to society than those who commit crimes without
a bias motivation. 104 Hate crime legislation remains necessary, therefore,
because "it condemns the particular way in which the victims have been
humiliated the damage to their sense that they are judged for who they
uniquely are." 05

99. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN
LAW 169 (1999).
100. Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate
Crimes Legislation are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 742 (1999).
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id at 744.
105. Id. at 745. Taslitz notes that "all humans have equal worth" and that "punishment is
deserved according to the wrongdoer's choice to disregard another's value." Id. at 756. He
further explains that when harm is inflicted against persons "because they are viewed as
representatives of a category and not as unique individuals, their special value is disregarded."
Id (citing SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND
MANSLAUGHTER 73, 114 (1998)). In this way, "a hate criminal is culpable because he is the
kind of person whose rationally chosen actions contribute to robbing the meaning of both the
victim's life and our collective lives as American citizens." Id. (citing PILLSBURY, supra note
105, at 73). Therefore, "[h]ate crimes legislation thus helps to dismantle group-based status
hierarchies that are inconsistent with the egalitarian spirit of our modern constitutional
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Despite the extended ability to prosecute hate crimes at the federal level
through the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, the limits on its
effectiveness, together with the fact that too many hate crimes occur for the
federal government to prosecute, support the conclusion that prosecution
through state hate crime law remains a necessity. 0 6 The FBI's UCR
Program released hate crime statistics for 2016 indicating that law
enforcement agencies reported 6,121 criminal incidents that were motivated
by bias toward race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, sexual orientation,
disability, gender, or gender identity. 0 7 The number of hate crimes reported
increased almost five percent from 5,850 criminal incidents reported in
2015.1s Victims of hate crime are more likely to report the crime if they are
aware of a special reporting system for collecting hate crime data.' 09 This
increase in reporting may not only indicate a potential rise in the number of
incidents committed, but also an increase in society's willingness to engage
with this issue.
Despite the fact that Roof's crimes were treated as hate crimes under
federal law, they would not be treated as such in state courts. 1o In an article
by the Post and Courier, then-U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch
explained that "South Carolina does not have a hate crimes statute, and as a
result, the state charges do not reflect the alleged hate crimes offense
reflected in the federal indictment returned today.""' More specifically,
"[i]n South Carolina, there is no legal distinction between shooting someone
in a drug deal gone wrong and gunning down an innocent man because of

culture." Id. at 761 (citing J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 234344 (1997)).
Professor Balkin makes a similar point:
The Constitution has an egalitarian demand, a demand which is more than a demand
for equality of civil rights, and more than a demand for equality of political rights. It
is a demand for equality of social status .... This egalitarian demand is what
connects the Constitution to our founding document, the Declaration of
Independence. It is the deep meaning of the American political experience. It is the
soul of our Constitution.
Id. at 761 n.120 (citing Balkin, supra note 105, at 2343-44).
106. See Trout, supra note 15, at 150.
107. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2016 Hate Crime Statistics FBI (Nov.
13, 2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/resource-pages/hate-crime-2016-_summary.
108. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 2015 Hate Crime Statistics FBI (Nov.
14, 2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2015/resource-pages/hate-crime-2015-_summaryfin
al; Christopher Mathias, Hate Crimes Rose About 5 Percent in 2016, FBI Report Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/fbi-hatecrimes-report-2016 us 5a08c795e4b0 1 d2 1c83f46ac?al.
109. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81, at 13.
110. See Buckley, supra note 13.
111. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss4/5

18

Safran: A Time to Kill Hate: A Case for a Hate Crime Law in South Carolin
CRIMINAL JUSTICE

2018]

905

the color of his skin."1 2 Although a state hate crime statute would have
likely had little effect on the charges brought against Roof because the
harshest penalty would be sought under federal law, a state hate crime law
would help to address lesser crimes committed out of hate.113 These lesser
crimes "still send shockwaves throughout entire communities," creating a
"destabilizing, demoralizing, fear-inducing impact [that] warrants a serious
punishment."11 4 As previously discussed, the federal government's authority
to prosecute South Carolinians for hate crimes is limited, and less visible
crimes would not likely command a federal prosecution. 115 These crimes
still cause "a tremendous negative impact," so "it makes sense to allow the
state to prosecute them with that in mind."116
As one of only five states without a hate crime statute, South Carolina
implicitly condones bias-motivated violence despite its laws convicting
offenders of the underlying crime. The failure of the South Carolina
legislature to enact a hate crime law sends the message to all South
Carolinians that bias-motivated crime does not warrant enhanced
punishment for the additional pain and community suffering that it inflicts.
Therefore, the enactment of a hate crime statute would make clear that biasmotivated crime will not be tolerated in the State of South Carolina.
B.

CurrentStatus ofSouth CarolinaHate Crime Legislation

In order to determine potential reasons why the South Carolina
legislature has yet to enact a hate crime statute and to propose certain
language and other provisions for consideration by the legislature, a
historical review of previous bills should be discussed. The South Carolina
General Assembly first introduced a hate crime bill in the senate in 1997 as
Senate Bill 37 to enact a penalty enhancement statute for hate crimes. The
bill read in part:
To amend Chapter 1, Title 16 of the Code of Laws of South
Carolina, 1976, relating to felonies and misdemeanors, by adding
Section 16-1-130 so as to provide for an increase in the penalty for
an underlying offense if the offender intentionally selects the person
against whom the crime is committed or selects the property that is
damaged or otherwise affected by the crime in whole or in part

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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because of the offender's belief or perception regarding the race,
color, ethnicity, national origin, ancestry, religion, gender, sexual
orientation, or disability of that person or the owner or occupant of
that property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception was
correct . . . .""
In 1999, the senate bill was reintroduced with essentially the same
language as the 1997 bill, and the South Carolina House of Representatives
introduced a bill parallel to that in the senate."' The house bill introduced in
2011 defined a hate crime as follows:
A person who commits an offense contained in this chapter with the
intent to assault, intimidate, or threaten a person because of his race,
religion, color, sex, age, national origin, or sexual orientation is
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not less than
two thousand dollars nor more than ten thousand dollars, or
imprisoned not less than two years nor more than fifteen years, or
both ...

119

House Bill 3589, introduced in 2013, contained identical language to the
2011 bill, which was also referred to the House Judiciary Committee and
failed to be voted out to the house floor.' 20 In 2015 and 2016, house
members continued to propose hate crime legislation with the following
language:
To amend the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, by adding
Article 18 to Chapter 3, Title 16 so as to provide penalties for a
person convicted of a crime contained in this chapter with the intent
to assault, intimidate, or threaten a person because of his race,

117. S. 37, 1997-1998 Gen. Assemb., 112th Sess. (S.C. 1997) (emphasis added).
118. See S. 45, 1999-2000 Gen. Assemb., 113th Sess. (S.C. 1999); H.R. 3161, 19992000 Gen. Assemb., 113th Sess. (S.C. 1999).
119. H.R. 4239, 2011-2012 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011) (emphasis added);
see also H.R. 3149, 2001-2002 Gen. Assemb., 114th Sess. (S.C. 2001); H.R. 3711, 2003-2004
Gen. Assemb., 115th Sess. (S.C. 2003); H.R. 3631, 2005-2006 Gen. Assemb., 116th Sess.
(S.C. 2005); H.R. 3738, 2007-2008 Gen. Assemb., 117th Sess. (S.C. 2007); H.R. 3169, 20092010 Gen. Assemb., 118th Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 4224, 2010-2011 Gen. Assemb., 118th
Sess. (S.C. 2010).
120. See H.R. 3589, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., 120th Sess. (S.C. 2013).
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or

sexual

These bills were also introduced and referred to the House Judiciary
Committee but failed to return to the house floor for consideration.1 22
None of the previously proposed hate crime bills have made it out of the
South Carolina State House "due to concerns about restricting thought and
speech," as "current language criminalizes the intent to 'intimidate or
threaten.'"1 23 First, as discussed in Part III, the United States Supreme Court
along with several state supreme courts have determined that state hate
crime statutes which provide an increased penalty for bias-motivated crimes
are constitutional and do not violate the First Amendment because they
penalize conduct, not expression.1 24 Specifically, during the creation of its
penalty-enhancement statute, the Wisconsin legislature determined that
"bias-motivated conduct caused particular harms above the crime itself, such
as retaliatory criminal activity, increased emotional harms on the victims of
such crime, and increased community unrest, which combined to result in
crimes of different natures from those that are not bias-driven."1 25 In
addition, the Court held that "the legislature's intent to prevent such
additional harms was a compelling state interest," deciding that the statute
was constitutional. 126 Therefore, because the intentional selection of a victim
based on an actual or perceived characteristic is conduct, not expression, the
South Carolina legislature's concern that hate crime legislation would
unconstitutionally restrict speech is unwarranted.
Similarly, the argument that hate crime legislation would restrict or
otherwise unlawfully punish thought is also without merit. Although the
First Amendment prohibits restriction of thought,1 27 hate crime legislation
does not unconstitutionally restrict or punish thought if drafted carefully. For
example, Wisconsin's statute, upheld as constitutional in Mitchell, contains
language that focuses on the act, not on expression protected by the First
Amendment: "intentionally selects the person against whom the crime is

121. H.R. 3404, 2015-2016 Gen. Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2015) (emphasis added);
H.R. 4439, 2016-2017 Gen. Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2016); H.R. 4463, 2016-2017 Gen.
Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2016); H.R. 4533, 2016-2017 Gen. Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C.
2016); H.R. 4618, 2016-2017 Gen. Assemb., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2016).
122. Id.
123. Buckley, supra note 13.
124. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993).
125. Eun Hee Han, Hate Crimes and Hate Speech, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 679, 690
(2006) (citing Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-88).
126. Id. at 670 (citing Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-88).
127. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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committed ... because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of
that person."' 2 8 It is "the intentional selection of a victim based on specified
characteristics [that] is itself an act."1 29
In our society, we understand "that acts undertaken by individuals are
motivated by thought and some sort of mental process that preceded the
act."13 0 However, "the act of intentionally selecting a victim and then
engaging in criminal conduct against that person [results in] . . . two acts, not

one act plus an underlying thought process."' 3 ' People are free to think
biased thoughts, but when those thoughts lead to criminal conduct resulting
in harm against another intentionally selected because of an identifiable
characteristic, hate crime laws allow for enhanced punishment because of
that intentional selection. Drafting the statute in this way prevents
mischaracterization of the law "as seeking to punish criminals solely for
their bigoted thoughts" and instead focuses the attention where it should
be-on the act

of intentional

selection

of the victim. 132

Therefore,

lawmakers' concern as to punishment of thought is unwarranted because
hate crime statutes criminalize the act of intentional selection, not the
thoughts that precede it.
V.

PROPOSED SOUTH CAROLINA HATE CRIME STATUTE

A.

Two Statutory Models

While most hate crime statutes can be categorized into one of two
models, South Carolina should adopt the discriminatory selection model
based on Wisconsin's statute to avoid potential constitutional challenges by
focusing on the offender's act of selection rather than his or her mental
processes. The discriminatory selection model requires only that the
defendant select the victim because he or she shares a characteristic with a
particular group.' 33 Under this model, the reason for the offender's selection
is irrelevant just the fact that the offender selected the victim based on a
protected characteristic is sufficient. 14 The racial animus model, on the

128. Wis. STAT. § 939.645(b) (2017) (emphasis added).
129. Richard Cordray, Free Speech and the Thought We Hate, 21 OHIo N.U. L. REV.
871, 884 (1995).
130. Id
131. Id
132. Id. at 879.
133. LAWRENCE, supra note 99, at 29.

134. See id.
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other hand, requires that the defendant act out of hatred for the group with
which the victim is associated.135 The racial animus model "defines crimes
on the basis of the perpetrator's animus for the racial or ethnic group of the
victim and the centrality of this animus in the perpetrator's motivation for
committing the crime."1 36

The statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell was a discriminatory selection statute. 137 In contrast, New Jersey's
statute follows the racial animus model, which "enhances the criminal
penalty for a crime that is motivated, at least in part, by 'ill will, hatred, or
bias due to race, color, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity."'1 38 Under
this model, the offender must have committed the crime with hostility
toward the victim because he belongs to a particular group.1 39
Although these two models of hate crime statutes are distinct, most state
statutes do not fit squarely in one category or the other.1 40 Instead, most
states and the federal civil rights crime statutes have adopted a because of
formulation, which "require only that the defendant has committed the
parallel crime and that the crime be committed because of the victim's

135. Id
136. Id. at 30.
137. Id. Wisconsin's hate crime statute was based on model legislation originally drafted
by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in 1981. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81,
at 1. The ADL was originally established following a "brutal, anti-semitic crime the lynching
of a Jew named Leo Frank in Atlanta, Georgia-[which] provided dramatic evidence of the
need to combat criminal conduct motivated by bigotry." Steven M. Freeman, Hate Crime
Laws: Punishment Which Fits the Crime, 1992 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 581, 581 (1992). Since
1981, forty-three of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia have adopted a state hate
crime statute. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81, at 2. The section of the ADL's
model legislation concerning bias-motivated crimes reads as follows:
A person commits a Bias-Motivated Crime if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or gender of
another individual or group of individuals, he violates Section _ of the Penal
Code (insert code provisions for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment,
menacing, intimidation, assault, battery and or other appropriate statutorily
proscribed criminal conduct).
A Bias-Motivated Crime under this code provision is a
misdemeanor/felony (the degree of criminal liability should be at least one degree
more serious than that imposed for commission of the underlying offense).
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 81, at 4-5. The approach under this model is "to
punish an already-defined crime more heavily where commission of that crime was motivated
by bias based on race, religion, national origin, or other enumerated characteristics of the
victim or other person." Wang, supra note 36, at 66.
138. LAWRENCE, supra note 99, at 34 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (1992)).
139. Id at 34.
140. See id. at 35.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 5
910

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 887

race."141 Lawrence argues, however, that the racial animus model is
preferable because it encompasses the characteristics of a discriminatory
selection statute while also supporting the conclusion that "bias crimes ought
to single out criminal conduct that is motivated by racial animus."1 42
However, the use of language such as "motivated by" under the racial
animus model potentially turns the attention towards the perpetrator's mental
processes rather than focusing on the act itself.1 43 For this reason and those
mentioned in the previous section, South Carolina should adopt the
discriminatory selection model based on Wisconsin's statute in order to
avoid a mischaracterization of the statute's purpose.
B. Policy Considerations
In drafting a hate crime statute, the South Carolina legislature must
consider the type of statute to enact, the crimes to which the statute will
apply, and the categories of characteristics to be protected under the statute.
First, because bill sponsors' objective for hate crime laws is typically to
deter and punish hate crimes, legislators often decide to create a penalty
enhancement law that imposes a more severe punishment for crimes in
which the offender intentionally selects the victim on the basis of certain
characteristics rather than creating a separate offense statute.144 There are
three possible reasons why most states have opted for this choice. 14 The
first reason is that, generally, when a perpetrator of crime targets victims
because of some identifiable characteristic, it is more likely that he or she
will commit another targeted crime in the future.1 46 Another reason why
legislators choose to create a sentence enhancement statute is because the
harm caused by hate crimes tends to be greater than that caused by the
underlying offense, as the act is considered to be an assault on the victim's
community rather than an isolated incident.1 47 Finally, due to the nature of
bias-motivated crimes, the harm that is created is typically more extensive
and severe than in crimes without bias motivation. 148
Next, once a state has determined that it would like to adopt a penalty
enhancement statute, the next consideration is the crimes that should be

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 36.
Id at 79, 175.
See Cordray,supra note 129, at 879.
Id at 874.
Id
Id
Id
Id. at 875.
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subject to the enhancement.1 49 The Wisconsin statute provides an example
of penalty enhancement applied to all crimes in the state's criminal code."1o
Ohio's statute, on the other hand, "only applies to . . . a small subset

of ... offenses identified in the State's criminal laws.""' Narrowing the
crimes to which the enhancement may be applied, however, may cause
unintended difficulty in its interpretation by courts.152 A broader scope of
crimes to which the hate crime statute would apply would likely be the better
choice, as it would apply to all crimes equally. 1'
Lastly, a final consideration is the "categories of identifiable
characteristics . . . to be protected under such laws." 5 4 Typically, drafters
track "the established provisions of antidiscrimination laws.""' The
language used in South Carolina's anti-discrimination laws to identify the
protected characteristics closely follows federal law, stating that an
employer is prohibited from discriminating against an individual "because of
the individual's race, religion, color, sex, age, national origin, or
disability."' 5 6 Proposed legislation in South Carolina should likely follow
the provisions set out in its anti-discrimination laws but may also include
additional categories usually protected in state hate crime statutes.
C. Proposal: The Senator Clementa Pinckney and Emanuel Nine Hate
Crime Act
The South Carolina legislature should consider changing the language of
recent unsuccessful hate crime bills from "intent to intimidate or threaten" to
focus on the "intentional selection" of the victim. If the legislature adopts the
following suggestions and considers additional provisions, South Carolina
can successfully enact a hate crime statute. First, to alleviate legislative
concerns discussed in Section IV.B regarding the "intent to intimidate or
threaten . . ." language of South Carolina's most recent bill, this proposal
suggests using the language of "intentional selection" similar to Wisconsin's
statute. Use of this language will make clear that a person convicted of an
underlying criminal offense who "intentionally selected" the victim based on
certain protected characteristics may be subject to an enhanced sentence

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id. at 875-76.
Id. at 876 (citing Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1992)).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 877.
Id.
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80 (Supp. 2017).
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because of the accompanying act of intentional selection, not the defendant's
intentions or thoughts.
Second, for the reasons discussed in Section V.A, this proposal suggests
"because of' language rather than "motivated by." Specifically, the statute
will enhance sentence penalties for persons convicted of an underlying
criminal offense when he or she intentionally selected the victim because of
the victim's race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
ancestry, or disability. Using "because of' rather than "motivated by"
language keeps the focus on the intentional act of selection rather than the
biased or bigoted thoughts of the offender at the time of the crime. The
proposed statute will use because of in order to protect it from potential First
Amendment violation claims and will also specify the protected categories
so as not to be found unconstitutional for vagueness like Georgia's previous
statute.
Third, South Carolina should adopt a statute that enhances the sentence
for a person convicted of an underlying criminal offense if the trier of fact
determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender intentionally
selected the victim because of an actual or perceived protected characteristic.
The accompanying act of intentional selection of the victim because of bias
or prejudice creates psychological harm in addition to the harm caused by
the underlying offense that affects the victim, the community associated with
the perceived group, and society as a whole.1 7 For these reasons, by
adopting a sentence enhancement hate crime statute, South Carolina would
rightfully condemn bias-motivated criminal conduct once and for all.
In addition to sentence enhancement, the South Carolina legislature
could consider additional provisions such as a system of guidelines and
procedures for identifying and reporting hate crime and training for law
enforcement officers and other related agencies. Recently, the State of
Georgia pre-filed a hate crime bill.. that establishes sentence enhancement
and also instructs law enforcement to "incorporate training materials on
identifying, responding to and reporting activity that might involve a hate
crime." 159 Like South Carolina, Georgia is also one of five states in the U.S.
without a hate crime statute. 160 Georgia previously enacted a hate crime

157. See James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation:
Where's the Speech?, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 6, 9-10 (1992).
158. Kate Brumback, Hate Crime Bill Filed Prior to Georgia Legislative Session, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/georgia/
articles/2018-01-06/hate-crime-bill-filed-prior-to-georgia-legislative-session.
159. Id.
160. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supranote 12.
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statute in 2000161 that was determined to be unconstitutional due to
vagueness by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 2004.162 Remedying prior
issues, the Georgia bill seeks to "provide sentencing of defendants who
commit certain crimes which target a victim or his or her property because
of the defendant's belief regarding the victim's race, color, religion, national
origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, mental disability, or
physical disability."1 63 Specifically, the operative language of the proposed
statute reads in part:
[I]f the trier of fact determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property of the
victim as the object of the offense because of the individual's belief
or perception regarding the race, color, national origin, sexual
orientation, gender, gender identity, mental disability, or physical
disability of such person or group of persons, whether or not such
individual's belief or perception was correct . . . .164
Additional provisions for identification and reporting of hate crime in
South Carolina, as well as training and information for law enforcement
officers and agencies, and civil liability for hate crimes would bolster the
enforcement of the hate crime statute.
Finally, the sentence enhancement statute should apply broadly to
criminal offenses, and the protected characteristics should cover a wide
range of groups so as not to favor any one class over another. Based on the
1997 Senate Bill 37, the sentence enhancement should apply to crimes
classified or exempted under section 16-1-10 of the South Carolina Code of
Laws. This broad scope of crimes would allow the sentence enhancement to
apply to all crimes equally and would prevent unintended difficulty in
interpretation by courts. The categories protected under the hate crime

161. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-17 (repealed 2004).
162. Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512, 514 (Ga. 2004).
163. H.R. 660, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018). Section 1-1 of the bill would
enact a new code section imposing a sentence enhancement for defendants guilty of crimes
involving bias or prejudice. Section 1-2 establishes a notification requirement to which the
state must adhere in order to seek the penalty enhancement. Section 1-3 specifies that the
reasonable doubt standard of proof is necessary for a determination of guilt as to enhancement
of the sentence. Section 2-1 mandates the establishment of guidelines and procedures for
training, identification, and reporting of hate crimes. Section 2-2 outlines the powers and
duties of the Georgia Crime Information Center, such as to provide a uniform crime reporting
system. Section 3-1 would enact a new code section establishing civil liability for hate crimes.
Id.
164. Id.
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statute "should include qualities we all possess-race, color, national origin,
ethnicity, gender, religion, and sexual orientation."1 65 It could also cover
those characteristics protected by anti-discrimination laws, such as
disability.1 66 Because "any person in this state could become a victim of a
hate crime . . . [South Carolina's] hate crime law should be neutral or
generic in its definition and application . . . [and] must protect all citizens
equally and . .. punish without discrimination."1 67
VI. CONCLUSION

The historical and cultural forces of society help shape much of the law
that governs it. When an issue arises, society attempts to remedy the
problem by establishing certain principles and rules to guide its citizens on
how to handle it. Hate exists throughout our society and is "an unfortunate
side of human nature."1 68 It is something that we are often forced to tolerate

in everyday life.1 69 But when "these hateful and intolerant attitudes serve as
the basis of criminal conduct, tolerance must end, and criminal sanctions
must takeover."1e Although hate, prejudice, and bias-motivated violence
"cannot be legislated out of existence,"1 7 ' the adoption of hate crime
legislation in South Carolina will make clear that hate-motivated violence
will not be tolerated in this state.
While we may not have been able to change the biased thoughts of
Dylann Roof or others like him on that fateful night, our hope is that one day
future bias-motivated conduct can be prevented through the deterrence of a
hate crime law. Following the deaths of the Emanuel Nine, "almost every
public figure ... has rightfully condemned the hatred that drove the gunman
to kill. State law should more closely reflect that condemnation."1 72 The
South Carolina General Assembly has failed to enact a hate crime statute
due to concerns that the language in previous bills unconstitutionally
restricts thought and speech. These concerns, however, are unwarranted
because hate crime statutes that increase the penalty for bias-motivated

165. Mark Pryor, Why We Need Hate Crime Legislation in Arkansas: Stopping BiasMotivated Violence, 36 ARK. LAW. 28, 30 (2001).
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80 (Supp. 2017).
167. Pryor, supra note 165, at 30.
168. Eric David Rosenberg, Hate Crimes, Hate Speech and Free Speech Florida's
Bias-Intended Crime Statute, 17 NOVA L. REV. 597, 601 (1992).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Pryor, supra note 165, at 28.
172. Buckley, supra note 13.
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crimes penalize conduct, not expression, and therefore do not violate the
First Amendment.
South Carolina must enact a sentence enhancement hate crime statute
because bias-motivated crimes are more reprehensible than the underlying
parallel offense, as it harms not only the victim, but it extends devastating
psychological harm to their families, communities, and society as a whole. If
South Carolina fails to enact a hate crime statute, victims of bias-motivated
crime will remain unprotected, and perpetrators will not be punished if
even convicted at all-for the despicable targeting of another human being
because of race, gender, religion, or other perceived characteristic. The State
of South Carolina must join the forty-five other states in passing hate crime
legislation to deter bias-motivated conduct and declare to the nation once
and for all that hate will not be tolerated.
Erica G. Safran
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